Digital artificial world is structured by specific rules that are
somewhat different from those expressed and manifested in the physical
world we normally experience. One relevant difference is the definition
of identity. Since every ‘singularity’ is reproducible in infinite
number of identical copies, and there is no substantial difference
between copy and original, because the copy of a copy is exactly the
same as the copy of the original, the basic distinction between copy
and original is not relevant, and digital identity is not unique.

 Comparing this to any analogue reality, we can immediately perceive that some of the values
applying to physical world are to be reconsidered within the digital
domain. For example, an analogue tape recorded from a vinyl record will
play a different quality of music than that of the vinyl, and the
quality of the incision will be more and more compromised if we
continue copying the same track from one tape to another. This quality
decrease structures an inversely proportional relation with the
distance from the original content. Reproduction always depends on the
system used, both in case of analogue and of digital carriers.
Speakers, amplifiers and players reproducing a sound can affect the
quality of the result. But, in the case of an
.aiff audio file, for example, any copy will perform the same music,
given an identical system to be played from. Although this argument is
rather obvious, it leads to the idea that, since there is no
constitutional uniqueness inside ‘digitality’, there is no relevant
reason to limit the amount of copies that are to be created. From
another perspective, this example shows a peculiar
fragility that electronic content implies. In fact, any electronic
resource is depending on a certain variety of elements to be reproduced
and perceived (a player, an hard disc, a computer, a mini disc, and so
forth). Any damage to a single part of such complex system is
compromising the fruition of the entire. If a photographic picture on
paper can be visible when a corner of the image is corrupted, it will
be very difficult to display a file whereas a small part of it is
damaged. Although electronic and digital creatures have certain
properties in common, Virtual Entity is focusing on digital entities
living in the net, so to say
digital files online. The possibility to define these as ‘immaterial’
lays on the fact that the region where these are perceived is often
very far from the server they are laying on. People belonging to
generations not educated to a basic computer literation often think
mails are physically landing on their specific machine, missing the
point internet is basically ‘sitting’ somewhere else and simply copied
and/or displayed on local terminals. This apparent immateriality and
cohereness renders the perception of the internet obfuscated by common
beliefs. There is a specific moment when a file is created, and there
exists a very first instantiation of any file that is uploaded,
published and shared online. Once this poiesis is performed, the entity
is free to proliferate
indefinitely. Virtual Entity names this very first file that reaches
the internet a ‘native file’, or master. There is no way to distinguish
it from all its ‘nemesis’, after the act of creation. Since identity
appears to be distributed rather than concentrated, digital identity
requires a specific approach according to its essence. Virtual Entity
is a project structured by a double nature, and these two perspectives
interweave a dialogic relation. While a theoretical reflection on
‘digitality’ and its constitution is taking place in the background,
the development of a practical system to license and identify files
online has begun.